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JUST THE FACTS, MA'AM: REMOVING THE DRAMA FROM DNA
DRAGNETS
Jennifer K. Wagner'
Law enforcement is increasingly turning to "genetic
witnesses" to solve crimes. The incorporation of genetic
technologies like DNA ancestry tests and indirect molecular
photofitting has drawn criticism as high-tech "racial profiling. "
In cases where law enforcement has requested voluntary DNA
samples to assist with criminal investigations, critics have quickly
labeled the conduct "DNA dragnets." To facilitate a constructive
debate over whether and how law enforcement uses these genetic
technologies, the loaded language is removed and the legal
framework and scientific technologies are examined
I. INTRODUCTION
Current discussions on the criminal law implications of
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") ancestry technologies are fraught
with loaded language and patent political agendas.' When scholars
' J.D., Ph.D. candidate at The Pennsylvania State University. The author
would like to acknowledge David Kaye and Anne Buchanan for reviewing
previous versions of this manuscript and acknowledge Ken Weiss, Nina
Jablonski, Mark Shriver, Chloe Silverman, and Jonathan Marks for their
unwavering support and constructive criticism of the author's research.
2 See, e.g., MICHAEL BOYLAN, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, RACIAL
PROFILING AND GENETIC PRIVACY: DEFINING THE PARAMETERS IN CRIMINAL
CASES (2008), http://zedc3test.techprogress.org/issues/2008/03/pdf/racial_
profiling.pdf; Duana Fullwiley, Can DNA 'Witness' Race?: Forensic Uses of an
Imperfect Ancestry Testing Technology, GENEWATCH, 21(3-4) (2008); TANIA
SIMONCELLI & SHELDON KRIMSKY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR
LAW AND POLICY, A NEW ERA OF DNA COLLECTIONS: AT WHAT COST TO
CIVIL LIBERTIES? (2007), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics
.org/page Documents/PG6T8WPI4A.pdf; Troy Duster, DNA Dragnets and
Race: Larger Social Context, History, and Future. 21 GENEWATCH (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 3, 3-5 (2008), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics
.org/page Documents/AJWLK7MIAV.pdf; Sepideh Esmaili, Note, Searching
for a Needle in a Haystack: The Constitutionality of Police DNA Dragnets, 82
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frame the debate as a matter of the legality of "DNA dragnets" or
"racial profiling," they effectively stifle any legitimate intellectual
arguments relevant to law enforcement's use of DNA technologies
that are vital to a democratic society. As United States President
Barack Obama recently acknowledged, American society thrives
on "free and open inquiry;"' yet distortions of the science or the
law-intentionally or otherwise-push the discussion down
treacherous and unnecessarily divisive tangents. Debating the
constitutional merits of non-testamentary identification orders,
routinization of DNA sampling upon arrest, and the
appropriateness of forensic applications of DNA ancestry testing
and indirect molecular photofitting in criminal investigations
requires not only a "free and open inquiry" but also a nuanced
understanding of genetics and law.
The following discussion first provides an introduction to the
relevant legal context of criminal procedure. Because the
technologies discussed here (DNA ancestry testing and indirect
molecular photofitting) are not intended to serve as accusatory
evidence against a defendant,' but rather as investigative tools to
identify criminal suspects, the legal discussion is properly focused
on the investigatory phase prior to any arrest or prosecution.
Second, an introduction to the scientific method and theory of
DNA ancestry testing and indirect molecular photofitting is
provided. Third, law enforcement's application of DNA ancestry
CHI-KENT L. REv 495 (2007); Fred W. Drobner, Comment, DNA Dragnets:
Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REv.
479 (2000).
3 United States President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the
National Academy of Sciences Annual Meeting (Apr. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-
National-Academy-of-Sciences-Annual-Meeting/ ("Our progress as a nation-
and our values as a nation-are rooted in free and open inquiry. To undermine
scientific integrity is to undermine our democracy. It is contrary to our way of
life.").
4 While DNA fingerprinting is discussed in Part III.A and DNA fingerprinting
is intended to be accusatory evidence introduced during criminal prosecutions,
the constitutionality of DNA sampling as an arrest booking procedure is outside
the scope of this article. For a thorough discussion on the topic, see D.H. Kaye,
Who Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and
Other Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188 (2006).
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testing and indirect molecular photofitting is analyzed within the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, some concluding
remarks provide consideration about whether the use of DNA
ancestry testing and indirect molecular photofitting by law
enforcement is ethically justifiable, legally valid, or socially
sensible.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In order for a police practice to be valid, it not only must
conform to the baseline of protections provided by the United
States Constitution, but it also must conform to state constitutional
protections and statutory provisions. The following discussion
first explores federal search and seizure jurisprudence' and
subsequently examines a sample of state search and seizure laws.
Non-testimonial identification orders ("NIOs"), which are court
orders based on a level of suspicion lower than probable cause and
compel individuals to provide identification evidence to law
enforcement, will also be examined, as well as other basic methods
for collecting DNA samples.
A. Federal Constitutional Requirements
The Fourth Amendment6 provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
Whether a search and seizure conforms to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment requires a two-pronged inquiry into the
appropriateness of "the 'seizure' of the 'person' necessary to bring
him into contact with the government agents, and the subsequent
5 The possibility, albeit unlikely in light of relevant common law, that non-
testimonial orders implicate the Fifth Amendment is outside the scope of this
discussion and is left for other scholars to address.
6 The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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search for and seizure of the evidence."' Each prong of that
inquiry will be discussed here.
1. The Seizure of the Person
Not every encounter between the police and the public is a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Police interactions with the
public can be categorized as three basic types: mere encounters,
investigatory stops, and custodial stops.' The first-"the mere
encounter"-does not implicate the Fourth Amendment."o Police
officers, for example, do not violate the Fourth Amendment when
they ask questions of individuals who are willing to listen."
However, the Fourth Amendment is implicated by both the
investigatory stop and the accusatory (or custodial) detention. 2
DNA ancestry testing and indirect molecular photofitting are tools
with limited capabilities," and, as such, are useful to law
enforcement during the investigatory but not the accusatory phase
of criminal procedure. 4 Thus, the remaining discussion focuses on
8 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1969) ("And in determining whether
the seizure and search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual one-whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the inference in the first
place.").
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 117 (Pa. 2008); State v.
Harrell, 312 S.E.2d 230, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (citing State v. Sugg, 300
S.E.2d 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining the three types of police encounters
described in Terry)).
'0 E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628, (1991); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16.
"' See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002).
12 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ( "We therefore reject the notion that the Fourth
Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if
the officers stop short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown
search.' ").
'3 These techniques function together to provide predictions about individuals
(i.e. possible surnames and physical traits) based on statistical correlations that
the traits have with the genetic information tested and categorized on a
population level. Unlike DNA fingerprinting, these techniques do not provide
uniquely identifying genetic information or an individual's unique genetic
profile.
14 See infra Part III. The technology assists law enforcement in the
identification of a suspect but does not have any direct utility for prosecuting a
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the constitutional requirements during the search for a suspect in a
criminal investigation.
The Supreme Court has addressed when police conduct crosses
the line between a mere encounter to an investigatory stop, subject
to limitations and requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In
Florida v. Bostick, the Court stated:
[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches
an individual and asks a few questions .... Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred.' 5
Police may, for example, ask to examine an individual's
identification "even when officers have no basis for suspecting a
particular individual" of any wrongdoing.'" An individual may
refuse to answer questions posed by the police, and it is well-
established that an individual's refusal to cooperate alone is not a
sufficient basis to justify seizure." Whether a mere encounter or
an investigatory stop has occurred is determined by both
considering all of the circumstances and inquiring if "the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter."" Furthermore, it must be noted that "the
potential intrusiveness of the officers' conduct must be judged
from the viewpoint of an innocent person" in that position."
defendant. The technology provides law enforcement with information with
which they may seek to compel a DNA sample for direct comparison with a
forensic sample. Only upon a valid DNA fingerprint matching the suspect to the
crime scene would law enforcement have probable cause to arrest.
15 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (internal citations omitted).
16 Id. at 435 (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).
17 Id. at 437 (citing a line of cases as early as Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
52-53 (1979)).
8 Id. at 438.
'9 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519, n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (1977). See also Bostick, 501
U.S. at 438 (relying on Blackmun's dissent in Royer).
FALL 2009] 55
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
The Court has explained that investigative stops, when
reasonable, do not violate the Fourth Amendment, stating that:20
The reasonableness of a stop turns on the facts and circumstances of
each case. In particular, the Court has emphasized (i) the public
interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion,
and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer
relied in light of his knowledge and expertise.2'
In determining reasonableness, the Court has acknowledged that
"there is no ready test,"22 and the Court must balance the need for
the seizure with the privacy invasion the seizure entails. 23  The
basis for a police officer's seizure that invades an individual's
privacy must be "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion."24 The Court has long held that an
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" is
insufficient to justify an investigatory stop.25
2. The Search and Subsequent Seizure ofEvidence
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court reiterated that "police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure" unless exigent
circumstances excuse police from complying with the warrant
requirement.26 Probable cause is necessary to justify a search and
seizure pursuant to a search warrant.27 General warrants
authorizing blanket searches28 are unreasonable and have been
20 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (describing the
Terry ruling).
21 id
22 Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1969).
23 Id.
24 id
2 Id. at 27.26 Id. at 20.
2 See id.
28 NOlo's Plain English Law Dictionary defines "blanket searches" as "an
unconstitutionally broad authorization from a judge that allows the police to
search multiple areas for evidence without specifying exactly what they are
looking for." NOLO'S PLAIN ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (2009), available at
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/blanket-search-warrant-term.html. In this
context, I use "blanket search" to refer to warrants issued without particularity
as to who is to be the subject of the DNA search.
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considered by the Court to be invalid for at least 130 years.29 As
the Court has explained, "indiscriminate searches and seizures
conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the
Fourth Amendment.""o General searches-conducted with or
without a warrant-are therefore unconstitutional, and it is this
type of search that the Court has referred to as "dragnet-style"' or
"lawless wholesale roundup."32
Police may conduct a constitutionally valid search and seizure
of evidence, like a DNA sample, when the suspect provides
voluntary consent. Not only has the Court condoned voluntary
consent as a means to collect evidence, but the Court has also
encouraged cooperation, explaining that "it is an act of responsible
citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may
29 E.g., Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 583 (1980); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950)
(stating, "[G]eneral exploratory searches ... cannot be undertaken by officers
with or without a warrant."); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927)
(stating, "General searches have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights
... the [Fourth] amendment forbids them."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 627 (1886).
30 Payton, 445 U.S. at 583.
3 E.g., Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 and 450 (Marshall, J., in dissent, remarked,
"These sweeps are conducted in 'dragnet' style. The police admittedly act
without an 'articulable suspicion' in deciding which buses to board and which
passengers to approach for interviewing." Justice Marshall also declared, "the
Fourth Amendment clearly condemns the suspicionless, dragnet-style sweep
... ."); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 11, 93 S. Ct. at 770. But see Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 728-29 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring, stated, "There may be
circumstances, falling short of the 'dragnet' procedures employed in this case,
where compelled submission to fingerprinting would not amount to a violation
of the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of a warrant, and I would leave
that question open.").
32 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 5; see also Davis, 394 U.S. at 726 ("The Fourth
Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry . . . .").
3 See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228 (stating, "In short, a search pursuant to
consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the
search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly
legitimate aspect of effective police activity.").
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have to aid in law enforcement."3 4 Society has a significant
interest in encouraging citizens to consent to searches, since "the
resulting search may yield necessary evidence . . . that may insure
that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a
criminal offense."
The test of voluntariness of consent was adopted over thirty
years ago by the Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts
to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all
of the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to
refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not
required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
establishing a voluntary consent.36
Notably, the Court explained that voluntariness "has always taken
into account evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and
the lack of any effective warnings to a person of his rights."
Accordingly, the Court specifically rejected the criticism that
Fourth Amendment protections are accessible only to a privileged
class of citizens so long as prosecutors are not required to prove
knowledge to establish valid, voluntary consent."
When police act without the benefit of a warrant or voluntary
consent, determining what exactly the Fourth Amendment requires
for a valid search of a person requires a discussion of Schmerber v.
Calhfornia.39 The Schmerber Court reasoned that the purpose of
34 Id. at 232 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)).
31 Id. at 243, 93 S. Ct. at 2056 (referring to policy described earlier in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).
36 Id. at 248-49.
n Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 247-48 (stating, "It is also argued that the failure to require the
Government to establish knowledge as a prerequisite to a valid consent, will
relegate the Fourth Amendment to the special province of 'the sophisticated, v.
knowledgeable and the privileged.' We cannot agree.")
39 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Here, the Court considered, as a matter of first
impression, the constitutionality of blood samples taken from the defendant
without his consent (search of his person) to test for blood alcohol content
(seizure of evidence).
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the Fourth Amendment "is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State."40 The Court explained
that the amendment is not to constrain all intrusions but rather to
constrain only those "intrusions which are not justified in the
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner."4'
Noting that drawing a blood sample from a suspect against his will
constitutes a search, and that this type of search necessarily
"depend[s] antecedently upon seizures of 'persons' within the
meaning of that Amendment,"42 the Court explained the purpose of
the warrant requirement is to ensure:
that inferences to support the search "be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." The
importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the
issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of
guilt is indisputable and great.43
The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment prohibits "searches
involving intrusions beyond the body's surface ... on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained."44 However, the
Court ruled that the search for blood alcohol content via a
compelled blood sample was valid since exigent circumstances
excused the absence of a warrant.4 5
In Davis v. Mississippi-in which twenty-four African-
American males were taken to a police station, questioned and
fingerprinted without individualized suspicion or pursuant to a
search warrant-the Court suggested, in now infamous dicta, there
may be an occasion when obtaining fingerprints from individuals
during a criminal investigation, even without probable cause,
40 Id. at 767.
41 Id. at 768.
42 Id. at 767.
43 Id. at 770 (citations omitted).
44Id. at 770.
45 Id. at 771. See also Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 8-9; United States v. Chapel, 55
F.3d 1416, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (clarifying that the Schmerber
opinion was not based on a search incident to a lawful arrest, but rather a search
conducted under exigent circumstances excusing the warrant requirement).
FALL 2009] 59
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
might be valid under the Fourth Amendment.46 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, explained that:
It is arguable ... that, because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting
process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances,
be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is
no probable cause in the traditional sense. Detention for fingerprinting
may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security
than other types of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting
involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and
thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint
detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the
police need only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore,
fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving
tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to
such abuses as the improper line-up and the "third-degree." Finally,
because there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the limited
detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time.
For this same reason, the general requirement that the authorization
of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention would seem not
to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context.47
As the Court more recently explained in United States v. Dionisio,
it was not the taking of fingerprints on less than probable cause
that made the seizure of identification evidence improper in
Davis.48  Rather, "it was the initial seizure-the lawless dragnet
detention-that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments."49
The Court has permitted searches and seizures implicating the
Fourth Amendment despite the absence of either a search warrant
or even individualized suspicion in very narrow circumstances-
namely, in "special needs" cases.o The rationale provided is that
46 Davis, 294 U.S. at 727-28.
4 7 Id. at 728.
48 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 11.
49 id
5o See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987), quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating, "we have
permitted exceptions when 'special needs' beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirements
impracticable."); see generally United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir.
2004) (noting that "special needs" searches are a broader category encompassing
60 [VOL. 11: 51
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the "touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is
always 'reasonableness,' ""' and the Court has "made it clear ...
that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable."5 2
The special need for a warrantless and suspicionless search,
however, "must be substantial-important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest . . . [and] sufficiently
vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion."" Thus, the special needs doctrine
carves out an exception to the warrant and individualized suspicion
requirement for searches and is applicable when the governmental
interest involves "concerns other than crime detection," i.e., those
concerns which are "beyond the normal need for law
enforcement."54 This language has been coined the "primary
purpose" limitation."
3. The Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
Determining whether a search has occurred at all or whether a
search is reasonable necessarily requires analyzing if individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the
"administrative searches" by school officials, drug testing of maternity patients
by public hospitals, etc.).
5' Kincade, 279 F.3d at 822.
52 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (citing
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976); see also
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) ("[O]ur analysis begins, as it
should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with
the basic rule that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.'" (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))
(footnote omitted)).
5 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
54 Id. at 313-14.
5 See Kaye, supra note 4, at 197, n.60 ("[I]t seems odd to maintain that the
balance of interests permits dispensing with warrants or individualized suspicion
when non-law-enforcement interests alone are pursued, but not when both law
enforcement and non-law enforcement interests reinforce each other.") (citing
D. H. Kaye, The Constitutionality ofDNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 455, 494-95 (2001)).
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search.56 This inquiry is complicated when the object, like DNA,
was not considered by the Constitution's drafters. An expectation
of privacy has been found in one's body," but that expectation of
privacy is not absolute." A person has no privacy interest in
personal, physical characteristics that are "constantly exposed to
the public," like handwriting, voices, and facial characteristics."
Even information within one's body (i.e., characteristics that are
hidden from the public) is not granted absolute protection; rather,
such information is precluded from governmental search and
seizure only when the intrusion is "not justified in the
circumstances, or .. . [is] made in an improper manner."60
The Court's position on a privacy interest in one's identity (as
opposed to the saliva sample or any DNA contained therein) is
uncertain. It is well-established that "the ability to briefly stop [a
suspect], ask questions, or check identification in the absence of
probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving
crimes and bringing offenders to justice,"6 1 and the Court has not
yet enumerated an exhaustive list of the manners by which law
enforcement can reasonably "check identification." Is there a
meaningful distinction between identity and identification?
Obtaining a suspect's identity by name during an investigatory stop
has long been recognized as serving "important government
interests." The Court explained recently in a case involving an
individual's arrest for his refusal to identify himself to police
officers during an investigative stop for a reported assault that:
Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted
for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On
the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the
56 See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' ".).
5 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766-72.
ss See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
" See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 4. In other words, "[u]nder existing law, public
exposure defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy, insulating the investigative
practice from Fourth Amendment scrutiny." Kaye, supra note 4, at 189.
60 Schmerber at 768.
61 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
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police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere . . . . Officers . . . need to
know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the
threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim. 62
The Court continued, "[t]he request for identity has an immediate
relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry
stop."63  Whether obtaining a suspect's identity via DNA
identification-as opposed to testimonial evidence or
documentation like a driver's license-is reasonable has not yet
been directly addressed by the Court. Moreover, the privacy
interest in one's identity as determined by DNA may be analogized
to one's identity as determined by fingerprints.'
The Court has had opportunity to address sense-enhancing
technology, such as thermal imaging devices employed outside of
a home to detect heat use patterns within a home, but notably not
yet in the context of a search and seizure of a person (or DNA
information specifically)." In Kyllo v. United States,66 the Court
explained that use of "sense-enhancing technology to collect any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise be obtained without physical" invasion is a search "at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use."67 The applicability of the Kyllo analysis to searches of
persons for DNA identification is uncertain, as searches of persons
have traditionally been analyzed differently from searches of other
objects."
62 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004).6 1Id. at 188.
6 See supra Part II.C. However, DNA is recognizably capable of revealing
information that has little to do with identity (e.g., genetic susceptibility to
particular conditions or traits).
65 See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that police use of a
thermal imaging scan of a house to determine if marijuana was being grown
inside it was an unreasonable search).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 34 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
68 See Schmerber at 768 (explaining "limitations on the kinds of property
which may be seized under warrant, as distinct from the procedures for search
and the permissible scope of search, are not instructive in this context [that is,
the context of 'intrusions into the human body'].").
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B. Federal Statutory Requirements or Guidelines
There remains uncertainty as to whether Fourth Amendment
challenges are to be resolved under a bright line, per se rule
requiring a warrant to be reasonable or, alternatively, a balancing
approach based on the totality of the circumstances.69 As early as
1971, amendments were proposed to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41.1 that would have set a uniform procedure for
compulsory nontestimonial identification evidence.70 The
proposed rule would have allowed a federal magistrate to issue
NIOs on less than probable cause.7 ' The proposed rule would have
permitted an order to be issued upon an affidavit establishing (1)
probable cause that a crime has been committed; (2) "reasonable
grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that
the person named or described in the affidavit committed the
offense;" and (3) that the results would be of "material aid in
determining whether the person ... committed the offense."72
Nontestimonial identification evidence was defined as including
"fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood
specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples, or other
reasonable physical or medical examination, handwriting
exemplars, voice samples, photographs, and lineups."" The
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference noted that "carefully written and well-enforced
regulations" as to what police conduct is appropriate would
69 For a discussion of the two theories of reasonableness, see Mark P. Asselta,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Compulsory Identification Procedures on
Less Than Probable Cause: Reassessing the Davis Dictum, 89 DICK. L. REV.
501, 512-19 (Winter 1984).
70 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments 1971),
reprinted in 52 F.R.D. 409, 462 (1971).
7 52 F.R.D. 409, 463 (1971). Notice that on occasion, nontestimonial
identification orders are referred to as "NTOs" rather than NIOs. See Paul C.
Giannelli, ABA Standards on DNA Evidence: Nontestimonial Identification
Orders, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2009, at 24, available at 24-SPG Crim. Just. 24.
(West).
72 52 F.R.D. 409, 463.
3 Id. at 466-67.
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"certainly be a helpful step."74 The proposed rule only had limited
support even at the time of its drafting and was never adopted."
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Standards for
Criminal Justice include guidelines for collecting DNA samples.7 6
Specifically, the ABA suggests that NIOs for compulsory DNA
samples should be permissible only after notice and a hearing."
Moreover, the ABA guidelines would require that NIOs should be
issued differently depending on whether the person targeted by the
NIO is suspected of committing a crime." If the person is
suspected of a crime, there must be probable cause that a crime
was committed.7 9 Furthermore, the ABA guidelines would set the
level of suspicion as a function of the intrusiveness of the
nontestimonial identification procedure." If the procedure is
physically invasive, probable cause that the person committed the
crime would be required before an NIO could be issued; however,
if the procedure is non-invasive, the NIO could be issued upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion that the person committed the
crime."' For situations when particularized suspicion for any one
individual is not available-like those situations when DNA
ancestry tests and indirect molecular photofitting may have the
most utility-the ABA guidelines provide that NIOs should be
issued only after a showing of probable cause that a crime was
committed82 and a showing that:
a sample is necessary to establish or eliminate that person as a
contributor to or source of the DNA evidence or otherwise establishes
the profile of a person who may have committed the crime, either
because there is reason to believe that the person has contributed to or
74 Id. at 468.
7 See James G. Cavoli, Comment, Can the Government Get Into Your
Genes?. A Proposed New York Statute for the Use of Genetic Identification to
Establish Probable Cause, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1355, 1408 (1992).
76 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE, 3d ed. 2007,
Standard 16-2.2.
n Id. Standard 16-2.2(b).
78 Id. Standard 2.2(b)(i), contrasted with 2.2(b)(ii).
79 Id. Standard 2.2(b)(i).
80 Id. Standard 16-2.2(b)(i)(B).
81 Id. Standard 2.2(b)(i)(B).
82 Id. Standards 2.2(b)(ii)(B)(2) and 16-2.2(b)(ii)(B)(1).
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been the source of the DNA evidence, or for other good cause shown
that the sample of that particular person is necessary for that purpose.
The American Law Institute ("ALI") has also weighed in on the
issue of NIOs with the promulgation of Uniform Rule of Criminal
Procedure 436 and Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
article 170.84 In commentary for the latter, ALI explained that a
"strict adherence" to probable cause would mean that individuals
would unnecessarily have police records, since police often have
sufficient evidence to arrest an individual (and thereby obtain
identification evidence) but may not yet have sufficient evidence to
determine whether prosecution against that individual would be
appropriate."
The ABA has also recommended standards for seeking
voluntary consent for DNA samples. 6 Specifically, the ABA
standards discourage police officers from seeking consent from a
number of individuals based on membership in a constitutionally
protected class (for example, seeking consent based on a group of
individuals' race or sex). Moreover, the ABA standards
recommend that police officers obtain written, informed consent
from the individuals providing the DNA samples, a process that
necessarily involves notifying the individuals of their right to
refuse." The ABA's recommendation that law enforcement obtain
informed consent evinced by a writing is more than what is
constitutionally required89 and reflects an established requirement
83 Id Standard 16-2.2(b)(ii)(B).
84 UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 436 (1987); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE art. 170 (Official Draft 1975).
8 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art. 170 (Official Draft
1975) cmt. at 462, as reprinted in Giannelli, supra note 71, at 27.
86 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE, 3ed. 2007.
87 Id Standard 2.4. It is yet unclear how the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008), will be interpreted. There is a possibility that GINA could be seen as
protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of DNA ancestry tests
with only indirect molecular photofitting. It is notable that GINA would only
have persuasive effect in a criminal context, as it does not make genism
unlawful in all of the 14th Amendment's broad reach, but only in narrow health
insurance and employment contexts.
88 Id
89 See discussion on Bustamonte and voluntariness of consent at Part II infra.
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when collecting DNA in human research settings."o Voluntariness
is contextual, a point that is often misunderstood when those
familiar with research requirements weigh in on what is or should
be required for establishing voluntary consent in law
enforcement."
C. State-Specific Requirements
Generalized discussions of what constitutes reasonable search
and seizure tend to ignore that state constitutions do not universally
mirror the federal constitution. While some states' constitutions
are generally in "lock-step" with the federal constitution, 92 the
constitutions of other states, like Pennsylvania, predate the U.S.
Constitution and frequently afford their citizens greater privacy
protections.' Even discussion of the exclusionary rule (which
requires unlawfully obtained evidence to be suppressed)94 must
include state-specific considerations, as states vary in the rationale
behind the rule. For example, the exclusionary rule in Illinois is
founded not only on deterring improper police conduct (like the
federal rule) but also the "preservation of judicial integrity."95 In
90 See generally Office of Human Research Protections ("OHRP"),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (describing requirements
for human subjects in research contexts).
9 Elaborating on the varying concepts of voluntary consent is outside the
scope of this article and left for later discussion.
92 E.g., Illinois and Nebraska. See In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill.
2008) (stating that the courts in Illinois "look first to the federal constitution, and
only if federal law provides no relief turn to the state constitution to determine
whether a specific criterion-for example, unique state history or state
experience-justifies departure from federal precedent.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Cronin, 509 N.W.2d 673, 676
(Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
93 See Commonwealth v. Basking, 970 A.2d 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
Pennsylvania courts will apply Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only "'where
[their] own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.'" Id.
at 1193 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (Pa. 1999)
and asserting accordance with Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655, 660 (Pa.
2000)).
94 See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 600 (2008).
95 People v. McGee, 644 N.E.2d 439, 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Grames
v. Illinois State Police, 625 N.E.2d 945 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); see also People v.
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Pennsylvania, the exclusionary rule is primarily designed not to
deter police misconduct, but rather to protect privacy.6
Nationwide, law enforcement can generally acquire DNA
samples for comparison with crime scene evidence in five different
protocols: (1) pursuant to a search warrant; (2) pursuant to NIOs
compelling suspects and/or non-suspects to provide DNA samples;
(3) pursuant to grand jury subpoenas compelling individuals to
provide DNA samples; (4) with voluntary consent from
individuals; and (5) through surreptitious or opportunistic seizures.
With the exception of opportunistic seizures (whereby law
enforcement obtain DNA samples from an individual unbeknownst
to him, such as from the individual's spit on a sidewalk later
collected by police officers as soon as the individual had left the
area, or from saliva or skin cells deemed "abandoned" on chewing
gum, soda cans, coffee cups, or trash)," each protocol will be
discussed to highlight the variety of ways states have addressed
DNA collection.
Whether compulsory saliva samples to acquire DNA require a
search warrant varies from state to state. In Michigan, such a
taking is deemed "a minor bodily intrusion which is permissible
without a search warrant,"9 8 but in Pennsylvania taking a saliva
sample constitutes a search presumably requiring a search
warrant.99 In Massachusetts there is a recognized expectation of
Zymantas, 497 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); People v. Garcia, 440 N.E.2d
269 (lll. App. Ct. 1982)).
96 Basking, 970 A.2d at 1193 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v.
Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (Pa. 1997)).
9 Discussion of surreptitious or opportunistic DNA sampling is outside the
scope of this article. See, e.g., D. H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA
Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-
Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 413, 435 (2003); JAMES D. WATSON AND
ANDREW BERRY, DNA: THE SECRET LIFE 231 (2004); Elizabeth E. Joh,
Reclaiming 'Abandoned' DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy,
100 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 860 (2006); New DNA Reader Identifies Suspects at
the Scene-Before They Strike Again, POPULAR SCIENCE at 48, 49 (1999);
Giannelli, supra note 71.
98 People v. Lovett, 272 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
9 Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 685 A.2d 151, 155-56 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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privacy in saliva when it is in one's mouth,'o and in California,
absent an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, a
"warrantless search is unreasonable per se."'' Moreover, even
what constitutes a valid search warrant varies.
For a search warrant to be valid in Georgia, it:
must contain a description of the person and premises to be searched
with such particularity as would enable a prudent person executing the
warrant to locate the person and premises definitely and with
reasonable certainty.... However, where the name ... is not given,
the description of the premises must be exact.102
"John Doe" warrants, for example, are constitutionally sufficient
for searches of described premises in Georgia."o3
In Pennsylvania, search warrants may not be used "as a general
investigatory tool to uncover evidence of a crime."0 4 The state's
rules of criminal procedure grant magistrates the authority to issue
search warrants "upon probable cause supported by one or more
affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority."' Courts in
Pennsylvania have explained that before a valid warrant may be
issued:
an issuing authority ... must be furnished with information sufficient
to persuade a reasonable person that probable cause exists to conduct a
search. The information offered to demonstrate probable cause must be
viewed in a common sense, nontechnical, ungrudging and positive
manner ... [P]robable cause is based on a finding of probability, not a
prima facie showing of criminal activity ... 0o
The specific requirements of a valid search warrant are set forth in
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 205: "[e]ach warrant
shall be signed by the issuing authority and [must] ... name or
describe with particularity the person or place to be searched
'oo See Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
1o1 People v. Smith, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
102 Landers v. State, 359 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added)
(quoting State v. Hatch, 287 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
103 Nichols v. State, 435 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
'04 Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1012 (Pa. 2007).
los PA. R. CRIM. P. 203 (B) (2007).
106 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 948 A.2d 875, 880 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 647 A.2d 583, 585-86 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(omitting internal citations and quotation marks)).
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.... "1o The accompanying comments make clear that "'when an
exact description ... is not possible, a generic description will
suffice.' "" It is this issue of specificity-whether police must
specifically name an individual who is a suspect subject to a search
warrant or non-suspect who is nonetheless a subject of an NIO-
that is at the heart of the debate over whether or how law
enforcement agencies can or should use DNA ancestry testing and
indirect molecular photofitting.
Although the proposed changes to the federal rule concerning
use of nontestimonial identification evidence'09 failed to gain
sufficient support, some state legislatures and courts have adopted
NIOs. Seven states were quick to adopt either statutes or judiciary
rules that permitted law enforcement to compel individuals to
supply nontestimonial identification evidence."' A comparison of
the NIO schemes of Colorado, North Carolina, Nebraska,
Michigan and New York is illustrative of varying approaches and
requirements.
In Colorado, NIOs are authorized by Criminal Procedure
41.1.' In 1981, the Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc, ruled
that this statute is not only valid under the Fourth Amendment but
also the Colorado Constitution." 2 Specifically, the Court stated
that:
Limited intrusions into privacy on less than probable cause are
reconcilable with Fourth Amendment guarantees when the following
conditions exist. First, there must be an articulable and specific basis in
fact for suspecting criminal activity at the outset. Second, the intrusion
must be limited in scope, purpose and duration. Third, the intrusion
must be justified by substantial law enforcement interests. Last, there
must be an opportunity at some point to subject the intrusion to the
107 PA. R. CRIM. P. 205 (2009).
'08 Rega, 933 A.2d at 1012.
109 FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41.1.
110 See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1) to 16(c)(3) (1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3905 (1978); COLo. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 (1973); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-625 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3301 to § 29-3307 (1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-271 to § 15A-282 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8-1 to § 77-8-4
(1982).
" See People v. Diaz, 53 P.3d 1171 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
112 See People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 31-33 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
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neutral and detached scrutiny of a judicial officer before the evidence
detained therefrom may be admitted in a criminal proceeding against
the accused.'' 3
Criminal Procedure 41.1 requires that the order be executed and
returned within ten days of its issuance; the execution of the order
occur in the daytime; and that the police detain the individual no
"longer than is reasonably necessary" to conduct the ordered
identification procedure." 4  Evidence authorized for collection
pursuant to a NIO in Colorado includes "[flingerprints,
measurements, blood specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples,
hair samples, specimens of material under fingernails, or other
reasonable physical or medical examination, handwriting
exemplars, voice samples, photographs, appearing in lineups, and
trying on articles of clothing.""' The order need not name, but
may describe, the individual subject to the order."6 If police do not
have probable cause after the results from the NIO are complete,
the suspect is entitled to a judicial order requiring the destruction
of all products and copies of the non-testimonial identification
procedures."
Colorado requires the police to follow a stringent procedure
when seeking to obtain non-testimonial identification evidence.
Police violate both state and federal constitutional provisions"'
when they obtain non-testimonial identification evidence without
either a warrant or a court order pursuant to Criminal Procedure
41.1. 1' While non-testimonial evidence discovered without a
warrant and without an NIO should be suppressed pursuant to the
exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court of Colorado has made clear
that "an illegal seizure of previous identification samples from the
defendant by the police does not foreclose the prosecution from
obtaining identity evidence through proper means after filing the
''
3 Id. at 31-32.
'1
4 Id. at 33.
" CRIM. P. 41.1(h)(2). See also Madson, 638 P.2d at 33.
116 CRIM P. 41.1(e). See generally People v. Harris, 762 P.2d 651, 656 (Colo.
1988) (en banc).
" Crim. P. 41.1(f).
1 CoLo. CONST. art II. § 7 and U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" People v. Diaz, 53 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Colo. 2002) (citing People v. Harris,
762 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1988) (en banc)).
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case." 20 Rather, once criminal proceedings have been initiated
against the individual, the prosecution may file a motion seeking
non-testimonial identification evidence pursuant to Criminal
Procedure 16 (II)(A).'
In North Carolina, NIOs are authorized pursuant to North
Carolina General Statute section 15A-271. Such an order allows
police officers to compel a suspect to provide identification by the
following procedures: "fingerprints, palm prints, footprints,
measurements, blood specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples,
hair samples, or other reasonable physical examination,
handwriting exemplars, voice samples, photographs, and line-ups
or similar identification procedures requiring the presence of a
suspect."' 22 An NIO "is an investigative tool available in cases
where there is not sufficient basis for making a lawful arrest."' 2 3
As the North Carolina Court of Appeals explained in 2000:
"Statutes governing nontestimonial identification orders were
enacted in order to provide the state with a valuable new
investigative tool to compel the presence of unwilling suspects for
nontestimonial identification procedures, even though insufficient
probable cause existed to permit their arrest." 24 An NIO "has a
lower standard than an arrest or search warrant because it has the
limited purpose of being used only as an investigative tool to
identify the perpetrator." 25
In Nebraska, NIOs are authorized pursuant to Nebraska
Revised Statute section 29-3302, which states in relevant part:
Judges and magistrates may issue orders authorizing identification
procedures for the purpose of obtaining identifying physical
characteristics in accordance with the procedures specified . . . . An
order may be issued by any judge of the district court, Court of
Appeals, or Supreme Court for service and execution anywhere within
the State of Nebraska. An order may also be issued by any judge of the
121 Id. at 1177.
121 id
122 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-271.
123 State v. Wilson, 551 S.E.2d 471, 475 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State
v. Welch, 342 S.E.2d 789, 792 (N.C. 1986)).
124 State v. Coplen, 530 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
125 State v. Pearson, 551 S.E.2d 471, 475 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v.
Grooms, 540 S.E.2d 713, 728 (N.C. 2000)).
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county court or other magistrate for service within the county of
issuance.126
A probable cause requirement, determined by the totality of the
circumstances, has been implicitly written into this statute by the
courts in 2003.127 In 1983, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld
this statute as constitutionally valid.128
In State v. McKinney, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that
the statute authorizing NIOs can be used to compel DNA
samples.' 29 The McKinney court recognized that police officers
could not use NIOs to obtain DNA samples unless they "have
probable cause to believe that the person whose DNA is sought. . .
committed the crime for which the DNA is sought."'3 0
In Michigan, there is no NIO statute or court rule, even if
warrants authorizing compulsory nontestimonial identification
evidence might be referred to as an NIO. However, in 1976 the
Michigan Court of Appeals considered-but did not decide-the
constitutionality of NIOs issued on less than probable cause and
stated "there is a clear trend toward permitting court-ordered
detentions for the purpose of obtaining physical identification
evidence in the absence of probable cause in the traditional
sense.""' The court refused to sanction NIOs in the absence of a
statute or high authority ruling on the matter.'3 2 Instead, the court
found "there is no such 'animal' in this jurisdiction as a court order
authorizing the detention of a suspect for the purpose of a
search.""' In other words, in Michigan, the only permissible NIO
is a search warrant based on probable cause.
In order for police officers in New York to obtain an order
compelling blood samples, there must be probable cause that the
suspect has committed the crime.'3 4 For a court to issue an order
1
2 6 NEB. REV. STAT. 29-3302.
127 See State v. Marcus, 660 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Neb. 2003).
128 See State v. Evans, 338 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Neb. 1983).
129 But see United States v. Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721 (D. Neb. 2005).
130 State v. McKinney, 730 N.W.2d 74, 87 (Neb. 2007).
'" People v. Marshall, 244 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
13 2 id.
133 Id.
134 People v. Afrika, 9 A.D.3d 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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compelling a blood or saliva sample, the prosecution must
establish "(1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed
the crime, (2) a 'clear indication' that relevant material evidence
will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and
reliable.""' Recently, scholars have revisited NIO schemes in light
of the growing recognition of law enforcement's reliance on DNA
identification evidence to solve crimes. For example, James G.
Cavoli proposed that New York adopt an "order for genetic
identification" based largely on the proposed Federal Rule of
Criminal Procredure 41.1.1" Others have openly criticized NIOs
for DNA sweeps of even a limited set of suspects with specific,
articulable ties to the alleged crime."' Even in the midst of new
criticisms against NIOs, some state legislatures have considered
adopting their first NIO statutes,"' which suggests that states are
divided not only on the constitutionality and underlying policy
rationales of NIO statutes, but also regarding the desire for means
to obtain compulsory nontestimonial identification evidence.
Compulsory nontestimonial identification evidence via a grand
jury subpoena is also subject to Fourth Amendment considerations,
135 Marino v. Kahn, 49 A.D. 3d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (upholding an
order to compel buccal swabs from defendant in connection with an assault
investigation and quoting Matter of Abe A., 437 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1982)).
136 Cavioli, supra note 75, at 1409-13 (1992).
1' See, e.g., STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE
LACROSSE RAPE CASE 60 (2007). But see Giannelli, supra note 71 (criticizing
the issuance of NIOs compelling forty-six members of the Duke lacrosse team to
provide DNA samples and photographs in connection with an alleged sexual
assault but concluding that NIOs have merit "when properly applied").
138 The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently considered adopting an NIO
statute but has not yet passed the measure. H.B. 560, Gen. Assem., 2007 Sess.
(Pa. 2007). The bill was never voted on; the last action was a referral to the
judiciary. The bill would have required a showing of "probable cause to believe
that a particular offense has been committed" and "reasonable grounds, not
amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the person named or
described in the affidavit committed the particular offense." Id. at lines 23-28.
Text of bill is available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/
session.cfm (search by bill "HB 560" in "2007-2008 Regular Session"). See
also H.B. 364, Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess. (Pa. 2005) (considered during the 2005
Regular Session) and H.B. 2438 P.N. 3737, Gen. Assem., 2004 Sess. (Pa. 2004)
(considered during the 2004 Regular Session).
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and courts and states have split on the issue of whether probable
cause is required.'39 The key question is "whether the presence of a
grand jury subpoena makes the search reasonable on less than the
probable cause that presumably would be necessary for the taking
of blood at the direction of the police."'4 0 The laws of
Massachusetts and Illinois illustrate some of the considerations that
accompany the propriety of grand jury subpoenas to compel
nontestimonial identification evidence.
Under Massachusetts common law, there is a recognized
expectation of privacy in one's saliva when it is in one's mouth.'4 '
A showing of "probable cause to believe that the suspect
committed a crime and that the evidence sought would aid in the
Commonwealth's investigation" is , required whenever the
prosecution seeks to compel a saliva sample from a person who is
neither charged nor under grand jury investigation.'4 2 However, it
is not necessary to show probable cause that the defendant
committed the crime when the person is the subject of a grand jury
investigation; rather, the grand jury must have "a reasonable basis
for believing (have probable cause for believing, if you wish) that a
blood sample will provide test results that will significantly aid ...
the grand jury in their investigation of circumstances in which
there is good reason to believe a crime has been committed." 4 3
The distinction between a suspect who is the focus of a grand jury
investigation and a suspect who is not flows from the "unique role"
grand juries play in the criminal justice system: the identity of the
'3 See, e.g., Woolverton v. Multi-County Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196
(1993); Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247 (1991); In the Matter of a Grand Jury
Investigation, 692 N.E.2d 56 (Mass. 1998); and Commonwealth v. Williams,
790 N.E.2d 662 (Pa. 2003).
140 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.7(d) (3d ed. 2007).
141 See Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
Contrast with Pennsylvania, where taking a saliva sample has been determined
not to constitute a search under either federal or state constitutions. Blasioli,
685 A.2d at 155-56.
142 Draheim, 849 N.E.2d at 829.
143 Commonwealth v. Williams, 790 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Pa. 2003) (quoting
Matter ofa Grand Jury Investigation, 692 N.E.2d 56, 60 (Mass. 1998)).
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offender is typically "developed at the conclusions of the grand
jury's labors, not at the beginning."44
Illinois recognizes a right to privacy in an individual's
"physical person." The inquiry as to the propriety of a search and
seizure that implicates such a right to privacy is whether the search
or seizure is reasonable, which requires "balancing the need for
official intrusion against the constitutionally protected interest of
the private citizen."'45 It is well-established that a compelled
appearance before a grand jury is not an unreasonable seizure.'4 6
In assessing reasonableness of grand jury subpoenas, the Supreme
Court of Illinois explained, "[t]he purpose of a grand jury
investigation is both to exonerate individuals under suspicion of
having committed a crime and to establish the probable cause
necessary for the arrest of suspected felons. No citizen is immune
from a grand jury subpoena."' 4 7 The court held that individualized
suspicion and relevance must be established before a person can be
compelled to provide roninvasive physical evidence via a grand
jury subpoena and that probable cause is required before a person
can be compelled by grand jury subpoena to provide invasive
physical evidence.'48 The rationale is:
[W]ithout the necessity of presenting some degree of individualized
suspicion to the court, it is conceivable that a grand jury investigating a
rape allegedly committed by a man of Oriental appearance might
subpoena physical evidence from all 50 Asian-American males in the
local community, none of whom was suspect for reasons other than his
race. Such a result would be an unreasonable invasion of the privacy
right protected by the Illinois Constitution.14
144 Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 692 N.E.2d at 60.
145 In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 935 (Ill. 1992).
1
4 6 See Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247 (1991) (citing Dionisio, 410 U.S. at
13; United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973)).
147 May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d at 935 (internal citations
omitted).
148 Id. at 935-36 and 938-39 (declining to follow Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp.
247 (1991), where a Federal district court refused to enforce a probable cause
showing before a grand jury subpoena could be issued compelling hair and
blood samples).
149 Id. at 935.
76 [VOL. 11: 51
DNA Dragnets
Illinois recognizes a narrow exception to the probable cause
requirement for readily observable physical features, which include
"handwriting and voice exemplars, fingerprinting, and appearance
in lineups[, all of which] leave the individual's body
undisturbed."'o Probable cause exists and supports a grand jury
subpoena for invasive bodily specimens when there is "substantial
evidence to support an objective belief that evidence of criminality
will be found.""' These same requirements limiting the grand jury
from issuing subpoenas-relevance and individualized suspicion
for readily observable physical features and probable cause for
invasive bodily specimens-are imposed on the police when
seeking evidence during an investigation.'52
Police officers can conduct searches in the absence of a warrant
when they obtain voluntary consent from the person being
searched.' However, what constitutes "voluntary" consent varies
across jurisdictions, although the factors to be considered are
generally based on the notion that there is a "tendency to submit to
the badge."'54
In Pennsylvania, to be validly given, consent must be
"unequivocal, specific, and voluntary" and must be "free from
coercion, duress or deception."'" Factors that should be
considered in evaluating whether consent was given voluntarily
include "the setting in which the consent was obtained; what was
said and done by the parties present; [and] the age, intelligence,
' 
0 Id. at 938.
1' State v. Watson, 825 N.E.2d 251, 266 (Ill. 2005).
152 People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 54 (Ill. 2006).
'' See Blasioli, 685 A.2d 151 (1996).
154 In People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976), the court explaified:
"Due to the tendency to submit to the badge and our belief that the right
to be left alone is 'too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime,' a policeman's right to request
information while discharging his law enforcement duties will hinge on
the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime
involved and the circumstances attending the encounter."
' Blasioli, 685 A.2d at 156 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gibson, 638 A.2d
203, 207 (Pa. 1994)).
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and educational background of the person consenting."'56 It is
noteworthy that in 1996, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found a
saliva sample to be given voluntarily despite the record showing
that the suspect testified that police told him he would be arrested
if he did not volunteer a sample and that he provided a saliva
sample only because of fear of arrest.17  The court found it
significant that (1) the individual was neither under arrest nor in
custody at the time the consent was obtained; (2) the individual
was informed in advance that the officer was investigating a crime
for which the individual was a suspect; and (3) the individual had
refused to provide blood and hair samples just prior to providing
the saliva sample."' Similarly, in Georgia, "a valid consent to a
search eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search
warrant."' 59 There must be more than a showing of "acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority" to prove consent was voluntarily
given, but "the voluntariness ... is determined by the totality of
the circumstances; no single factor controls."'
III. DNA IDENTIFICATION, DNA ANCESTRY TESTING, AND
INDIRECT MOLECULAR PHOTOFITTING
In this part, an introduction to the scientific technologies of
DNA identification, DNA ancestry testing, and indirect molecular
photofitting is provided. Such an introduction is necessary before
any discussion of the legal implications of law enforcement's use
of such technologies.
156 Id. at 157 (quoting Commonwealth v. Burgos, 299 A.2d 34, 37 (Pa. Super.
1972)).
' Id. But see Gibson, 638 A.2d 203 (1994) (holding that consent was not
voluntarily given when the police had not announced to the suspect the reason
for their visit to his apartment).
158 Id.
15 Brooks v. State, 677 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. 2009) (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at
219).
160 Johnson v. State, 678 S.E.2d 539, 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v.
Jones, 604 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) and State v. Jourdan, 589 S.E.2d 682
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003)).
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A. DNA Identification
DNA identification (also frequently referred to as "DNA
fingerprinting") analyzes loci (variable DNA molecules at specific
positions or sites) distributed throughout the genetic content of an
organism that are not known to have any functional significance
(that is, they are not known to "cause" or to predict any disease or
behavioral traits). 6 ' The thirteen loci comprising the standard set
assayed for DNA fingerprinting were chosen for their ability to
distinguish individuals, and the loci do not reveal any information
about one's genetic predisposition to medical conditions or
behavioral traits.'6 2 DNA identification has been described as not
assaying the actual information contained in a sequence, but rather
as assaying mere occurrences of variation in a sequence's
structure.'63  The DNA Identification Act of 1994 initially
authorized the FBI's Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS")
nationwide database.'" The database was expanded in 2004 with
the Justice for All Act and again in 2006 with the DNA Fingerprint
Act of 2005, which expanded law enforcement's ability to collect
DNA from arrestees in addition to convicted individuals.'6 5
161 The thirteen core loci used by the FBI are short tandem repeats (STRs) or
microsatellites. These repetitive sequences are in non-coding regions of the
genome. See D.H. Kaye, Please, Let's Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the
Revelation ofPrivate Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 70 (2007)
("There is no scientific evidence that the specific DNA variations used to
identify the sources of crime-scene DNA perform any biological function."),
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/25/.
For a discussion on how DNA profiling (or DNA identification) works, see
generally JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND
CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING (2007).
162 See Angus J. Dodson, DNA 'Line-Ups' Based on a Reasonable Suspicion
Standard, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 221, 229-30 (2000) "stating that DNA
fingerprinting "performed strictly for identification purposes, reveals nothing
about the suspect's physical characteristics, his risk of genetic disease, or any
other specific information likely to give rise to significant privacy concerns" and
arguing that RFLP analysis "reveals little more about a person's private life than
a fingerprint or mug shot").
163 Drobner, supra note 2.
'6 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210301, 108 Stat. 1796, § 2065 (1994).
165 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, Title II, § 204(a), 118
Stat. 2260, 2271 (2006); DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162,
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B. DNA Ancestry Testing
In contrast to DNA fingerprinting, DNA ancestry tests do not
distinguish individuals from each other. Rather, DNA ancestry
tests purport to reveal the most likely affiliation of an individual to
a population.'66 DNA ancestry tests come in three basic varieties:
Y-chromosome, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), and autosomal
tests.'67 The tests that use the Y-chromosome and the mtDNA are
employed to trace uniparental ancestry, specifically patrilineages
and matrilineages, respectively.'68 Because these regions of the
genome are generally considered to be non-recombining, the
inference can be made that genetic markers that are identical by
state are so because they are identical by descent, i.e., because they
shared common ancestry with the same original mutational
event.'69 As mutations occur over time, the haplotypes (the
Title X, § 1002(1), 119 Stat. 2960 (2005). For discussion, see Simoncelli &
Krimsky, supra note 2.
166 See DNAPrint Genomics, http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/products
andservices/anestrybydnal (last visited Sept. 8, 2009) ("Using complex
statistical algorithms, the test can determine with confidence to which of the
major bio-geographical ancestry groups, Sub-Saharan African, European, East
Asian or Native American, a person belongs . ... ).
167 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Marchani et al., Culture Creates Genetic Structure
in the Caucasus: Autosomal, Mitochondrial, and Y-Chromosomal Variation in
Daghestan, BMC GENETICS (2008); Carolina Bonilla et al., Admixture Analysis
of a Rural Population of the State of Guerrero, Mexico, 128 AM. J. PHYS.
ANTHROPOL. 861 (2005); Mark D. Shriver & Rick A. Kittles, Genetic Ancestry
and the Search for Personalized Genetic Histories, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS
611 (2004); Rick A. Kittles et al., Autosomal, Mitochondrial, and Y
Chromosome DNA Variation in Finland: Evidence for a Male-Specific
Bottleneck, 108 AM. J. PHYS. ANTHROPOLOGY 381-99 (1999).
68 Patrilineage is a descent group where descent is traced only through males,
and matrilineage is a descent group where descent is traced only through
females. Because only males have Y-chromosomes, Y-DNA is used to trace
genetic ancestry through the male line, or patrilineage. Because all individuals
inherit their mtDNA from their mothers, mtDNA is used to trace genetic
ancestry through the female line, or matrilineage. For a tutorial on lineages, see
African Ancestry-Understanding Lineages, http://www.africanancestry.com/
understanding-lineages.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). See generally MARK
A. JOBLING, MATTHEW HURLES, & CHRIS TYLER-SMITH, HUMAN
EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS: ORIGINS, PEOPLES & DISEASE (2003).
169 See generally Jobling et al., supra note 168.
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sequences of individual instances of the specific DNA molecules)
evolve a nested, tree-like structure of descendant sequences whose
differences reflect the specific mutational changes that have
occurred in the lineage of each sequence since its descent from its
shared ancestral sequence.'70 Haplogroups (groups of closely
related haplotypes that have shared recent common ancestry and
similar sets of mutational changes) generally are not fixed or
unique to a particular human population, but they do arise in a
single geographic area."' Thus, the statistically significant
differences in frequency of haplogroups among a set of
populations that have been pre-selected to represent the ancestral
history of a population can be used to estimate with which of these
putative parental groups a particular individual's haplotype is
affiliated.
The third form of DNA ancestry test 72 utilizes the biparental
inheritance of autosomal markers. Autosomal sequences acquire
tree-like descent similar to Y-chromsome and mtDNA sequences.
However, since each person contains two different copies of each
autosome (one from his/her father and one from his/her mother),
and since autosomal sequences undergo recombination that
scrambles the various haplotype sequences, autosomal ancestry
tests do not rely on haplotypes like Y-chromosome or mtDNA tests
do. Rather, autosomal ancestry tests rely generally on comparisons
of frequencies of alleles at very large numbers of different loci.
The loci analyzed are known as ancestry informative markers
("AIMs") and are those whose allele frequencies vary substantially
among some set of putative "parental" populations of which
individuals may be the admixed descendant."' The assumed
"parental" populations for ancestry tests performed in the United
States often represent four continental populations: European,
West African, East Asian, and Indigenous American.174 An
individual is genotyped at these AIMs, and the results are analyzed
70 id.
171 id
172 These are often called "proportional ancestry tests" or "biogeographical
ancestry tests."
173 See generally Shriver & Kitties, supra note 167.
174 id.
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using a maximum likelihood statistical analysis to determine what
combination of the genotypes at the test loci from the "parental"
populations would best explain the particular combination of
genotypes of the individual."'
The limitations and caveats of genomic ancestry testing have
been thoroughly discussed;"' however, a few points deserve
reiteration. First, it must always be remembered that proportional
ancestry tests do not provide absolute results of ancestry but
statistical estimates of ancestry.'" Second, the "parental"
populations in the analysis are samples from contemporary
populations used as proxies for "ancestral populations," which may
be inaccurate.'7 ' Third, the affiliations reported are based on
probability and subject to interpretation only with reference to the
confidence levels of the test.179
C. Indirect Molecular Photofitting
"The primary reason most forensic scientists want to know
about ancestry is to assist them in reconstructing physical
appearance; that is, to enable generalizations about overt
phenotypes that might help them identify the person, suspect, or
victim."'" Reporters have described direct molecular photofitting
as going "far beyond doing an identity-proving genetic
"7 Id.
76 See Kenneth M. Weiss & Jeffrey C. Long, Non-Darwinian Estimation: My
Ancestors, My Genes' Ancestors, 19 GENOME RESEARCH 703 (2009); see also
Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Illusive Gold Standard in Genetic Ancestry
Testing, 325 SCIENCE 38-39 (2009); Deborah Bolnick et al., The Science and
Business of Genetic Ancestry Testing, 318 SCIENCE 399-400 (2008); Jeffrey C.
Long & Rick A. Kitties, Human Genetic Diversity and the Nonexistence of
Biological Races, 75 HUM. BIOLOGY 449-71 (2003).
1 See J.K. Wagner, Redefining Native Americans in a Post-Genomic Era:
Legal Implications of Genetic and Genomic Ancestry Tests, AM. INDIAN Q.
(forthcoming); see also J.K. Wagner, Redefining Native Americans in a Post-




180 TONY N. FRUDAKIS, MOLECULAR PHOTOFITTING: PREDICTING ANCESTRY
AND PHENOTYPE USING DNA 429 (2008).
82 [VOL. 11: 51
DNA Dragnets
fingerprint.""' Direct molecular photofitting is the technique used
to infer phenotypes (i.e., physical traits) from their functional loci
(in other words, examining the "genes for" particular traits).18 2
Physical traits are more often than not the result of complex (and
often illusive) mechanisms of gene-gene and gene-environment
interactions.' Direct molecular photofitting is still in its infancy;
however, anthropological geneticists and scientists funded by the
U.S. Department of Justice'84 are actively working on.the research
and design of techniques to reconstruct (i.e., predict) skin, eye, and
hair pigmentation as well as facial morphology from a DNA
sample.'
While the world anxiously awaits development of reliable
direct molecular photofitting technologies, law enforcement is
currently able to utilize indirect molecular photofitting
techniques.'"' Indirect molecular photofitting does not rely upon
the functional loci causing the phenotypic expression of the trait.'
The superficial physical traits which were commonly the target of
18 Dick Ahistrom, DNA Sample May Be Enough to Build an Image of Your
Face, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at 8, available at http://www.irishtimes
.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0216/1233867939011 .html.
182 See Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice Schellekens, Forensic DNA Phenotyping:
Regulatory Issues, 9 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 158, 158 (2008) (explaining
that direct molecular photofitting-i.e. what the authors call "direct
phenotyping"-is to test an individual's genotype at specific loci that code for
phenotypes like hair color or texture).
183 See id.; see also Anne Buchanan & Kenneth Weiss, GWAS Revisited:
Vanishing Returns at Expanding Costs, at http://ecodevoevo.blogspot.com/
2009/04/gwas-revisited-vanishing-returns.html.
184 The DNA Initiative, started in 2004, has funded, for example, "Identifying
and Communicating Genetic Determinants of Facial Features: Practical
Considerations in Forensic Molecular Photofitting," and "Determination of the
Physical Characteristics of an Individual from Biological Stains." See
Alternative Genetic Markers, http://www.dna.gov/research/alternative-markers/.
185 See Gautam Naik, To Sketch a Thief Genes Draw Likeness of Suspects,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 27, 2009, at A9.
86 See Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice Schellekens, Forensic DNA Phenotyping:
Regulatory Issues, 9 COLUM. ScL & TECH. L. REV. 158, 179-80 (2008).
187 Such a technique relying on functional loci would be considered direct
molecular photofitting. Generally the science is not yet able to do this as human
genetics does not function in a "one gene, one trait" manner, but rather is
complex with gene-gene and gene-environment interactions.
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overt racism (such as skin pigmentation and facial morphology)
tend to be a function of DNA ancestry.'" In other words, indirect
molecular photofitting uses DNA ancestry information as a proxy
for the functional, or "phenotypically active," loci underlying
expression of these superficial traits.'" Currently, the technique
involves comparing the ancestry proportions of a sample of interest
to photographs of individuals with similar ancestry proportions. 90
It is important to note that individuals with similar ancestry
proportions may identify themselves with varying ethnicities
and/or races."' Moreover, it is critical to acknowledge that neither
DNA ancestry information nor indirect molecular photofitting
speaks to causation. DNA ancestry does not cause a trait-
whether criminal behavior or skin pigmentation-instead, DNA
ancestry is merely correlated with a trait or set of traits.192
DNA ancestry information and indirect molecular photofitting,
like composite sketches created from eye-witness descriptions,
have probative value despite their limitations. 93 It is well known,
88 See Jennifer Wagner and Mark Shriver, E-Letter to the Editor,
Misinformation, Social Construction and Genomic Ancestry Testing, SCIENCE
(2007), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/eletters/318/5849/399 (
"Social constructions (like anti-miscegenation laws and class/caste systems)
reduce gene flow and by influencing with whom we partner drive biological
differentiation.").
89 Frudakis, supra note 180, at 429.
190 Personal communication with Zack Gaskins, DNAPrint Genomics' former
technical director of forensics (June 25, 2009).
'' See Yann C. Klimentidis et al., Genetic Admixture, Self-Reported
Ethnicity, Self-Estimated Admixture, and Skin Pigmentation Among Hispanics
and Native Americans, 138 AM. J. PHYs. ANTHROPOLOGY 375, 375-83 (2009).
192 For an explanation of the theory of admixture mapping generally, see Paul
M. McKeigue, Prospects for Admixture Mapping of Complex Traits, 76 AM. J.
HUM. GENET. 1, 1 (2005); see also Kaye, supra note 4, at 9 ("The pivotal fact is
that the few STR loci that are in use reveal nothing about propensities to disease,
behavioral traits, or the like.").
1 Molecular photofitting technologies are notably limited to the extent that
causation is not synonymous with predictive value. Because any particular trait
is the product of a complex interaction of genetic and environmental factors, any
particular allele might have only a minor (yet statistically significant and
"causal") effect on the expression of the trait. As a result, the identification of
causative alleles for a particular trait does not necessarily imply the ability to
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for example, that eye-witness accounts are biased by "the other
effect" and are often unreliable as a result.'94 Indirect molecular
photofitting as an investigatory tool may be used to corroborate or
contradict eye-witness descriptions."' As such, the technology is
not inherently inculpatory and may prove to be, more often than
not, an exculpatory or quality control tool for law enforcement.
Pilar Ossorio, an associate professor of law and bioethics at the
University of Wisconsin and an opponent of the technology, has
explained that:
Genetically-based descriptions will not produce a particular suspect,
but a class or population of suspects. Of course, given the notorious
inaccuracy of eye-witness descriptions, trait genetic descriptions need
not be very specific or accurate to be at least as good as the status quo,
or to provide a useful independent means of assessing eyewitness
descriptions and other types of forensic profiles. 9 6
When investigators already have identified suspects on the basis of
other factors,'9 7 DNA ancestry and indirect molecular photofitting
can help narrow the search to a member of that group of potential
predict a reliable or accurate expression of the trait from merely genotype
information for those particular causative loci.
194 Institutionalized racial profiling in law enforcement-like that against
those perceived to be of Middle Eastern ancestry in the wake of incidents on
Sept. 11, 2001, which was criticized by the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination for the United Nations to the United States (2008) in their
Concluding Observations and motivated the U.N. to urge the United States to
adopt the End Racial Profiling Act-is often complicated by eye-witness
identifications tainted by biases, stereotypes, and facial recognition inaccuracies.
Co-founder of the Innocence Project, Barry Scheck, has reportedly stated, "[t]he
majority race is not as good at identifying minorities as it is its own race. This is
hard-wired in some way that we don't completely understand." ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Race Sometimes a Problem in Eyewitness IDs, available at
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26123421/. However, "the other race effect" has long
been recognized by anthropologists, psychologists, and others who have done a
poor job of explaining it to the legal profession and general public. See S.
Sangrigoli et al., Reversibility of the Other-Race Effect in Face Recognition
During Childhood, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 440 (2005).
195 As implied by the product name of DNAWitnessTM.
196 Pilar N. Ossorio, About Face: Forensic Genetic Testing for Race and
Visible Traits, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 277, 284 (2006).
197 Such as being employed at the same location as the victim, driving a car of
the same make and model as that leaving a crime scene, or living in close
proximity to the crime scene.
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suspects or widen the search if no one in the initial suspect pool
resembles the likely features predicted by DNA ancestry and
indirect molecular photofitting. It is critical to remember that
while DNA ancestry information and indirect molecular
photofitting are of extreme value to investigators who are dealing
with a cold case or when investigators have conflicting eyewitness
accounts, the technology is of virtually no value when investigators
have reached the accusatory stage and are merely acquiring
evidence to prosecute a specific suspect.198
IV. ANALYSIS
Investigators seeking DNA samples can obtain them in three
basic ways: (1) pursuant to voluntary consent from the individual
or group of individuals of interest; (2) pursuant to "DNA line-ups,"
NIOs, or grand jury subpoenas on the basis of reasonable
suspicion; or (3) pursuant to probable cause or a warrant.' 9 The
first of these methods is generally what critics refer to when
discussing "DNA dragnets." Voluntariness of the consent,
efficacy, and efficiency of mass collection of DNA samples for
comparison with forensic samples are just some of the many
criticisms of this method. 20 0 The DNA line-up has been argued to
198 As the Supreme Court in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 321
(1959) stated:
[A]ny arrest based on suspicion alone is illegal. This indisputable rule
of law has grave implications for a number of traditional police
investigative practices. The round-up or dragnet arrest, the arrest on
suspicion, for questioning, for investigation or on an open charge all are
prohibited by the law. It is undeniable that if those arrests were
sanctioned by law, the police would be in a position to investigate a
crime and to detect the real culprit much more easily, much more
efficiently, much more economically, and with much more dispatch. It
is equally true, however, that society cannot confer such power on the
police without ripping away much of the fabric of a way of life which
seeks to give the maximum of liberty to the individual citizen. The
finger of suspicion is a long one. In an individual case it may point to
all of a certain race, age group or locale . ...
(internal citation omitted).
199 See Dodson, supra note 162.
200 See Boylan, supra note 2 (arguing that racial profiling is ineffective and
statistical correlation is not enough to justify stopping innocent individuals as
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provide law enforcement with all of the benefits of DNA profiling
while simultaneously protecting civil liberties by requiring
investigators to adhere to strict procedural guidelines and limiting
the application of the technique to only the most serious
investigations. 201' The last of these three methods is the least
controversial since the level of individualized suspicion is greatest.
A fourth method, which cannot yet be considered a viable option,
is to compel individuals or groups of individuals to submit DNA
samples for identification purposes in the absence of a warrant,
probable cause, or voluntary consent. Such a method would
require recognition of a new exception to the probable cause and
warrant requirement, like a categorical exception for biometric
identification.2 02
The logical application of DNA ancestry information and
indirect molecular photofitting by law enforcement is to provide a
sufficient basis for subjecting an individual or small group of
individuals to compelled DNA sampling for identification
purposes. DNA ancestry tests and indirect molecular
photofitting-unlike DNA identification tests-do not provide
definitive results bringing an investigation to its end or declaring a
suspect to be the perpetrator of a crime with 99.9% certainty.
Instead, provide predictions and estimates that may prompt
additional investigation of an individual or group of individuals.
The critical question is not whether DNA ancestry information and
indirect molecular photofitting proves one's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; rather, the question is whether they can
potentially provide enough clues to support either (1) probable
cause to obtain a warrant or (2) reasonable suspicion to conduct
investigatory stops (such as for DNA line-ups203 ) or to obtain NIOs
and grand jury subpoenas.
part of an investigation, as "racial profiling is an unjustified expression of
racism .... ).
201 See generally Dodson, supra note 162.
202 Kaye, supra note 4, at 192-95.
203 See Dodson, supra note 162. "DNA line-ups" refers not to mass
collections of DNA (sometimes called "sweeps" or "dragnets"), but rather to
obtaining DNA samples from small groups of individuals based on reasonable
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A single eyewitness statement has been deemed sufficient not
only to issue a warrant based on probable cause to conduct a search
during an investigation, but also to find a suspect guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, even in the absence of any other inculpatory
information.2" While identifying the person or persons to be
searched by name is sufficient, it is not necessary for a search to be
constitutionally valid.205 Physical characteristics have been
deemed sufficient-even without a suspect's name-to establish a
valid search warrant based on probable cause.206 While merely
describing the race or ethnicity of the person to be searched is too
general to support a valid search,207 the physical characteristics
may be sufficient-even when they are described inaccurately.20 8
suspicion that each member of the group may have committed the crime under
investigation.
204 See Yancey v. State of Alabama, 2009 WL 725198, at 16 ("[T]he
testimony of an eyewitness, standing alone, is sufficient to support a
defendant's conviction . . . .') (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
205 See generally case law on "John Doe Arrest Warrants."
206 See Kimberly C. Simmons, Annotation, Sufficiency of Description in
Warrant ofPerson to be Searched, 43 A.L.R.5th I § 8(a) (1996). See, e.g., State
v. Frazier, 665 A.2d 142 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Dow v. State, 113 A.2d 423
(Md. 1955); Giordano v. State, 100 A.2d 31 (Md. 1953); Saum v. State, 88 A.2d
562 (Md. 1952); State v. Malave, 316 A.2d 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974); State v. Moriarty, 338 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); State v.
Martinez, 753 P.2d 1011 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). But see State v. Maddasion,
539 P.2d 966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (search was upheld where the warrant
described only the sex of the individuals to be searched and their clothing);
People v. Simmons, 569 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (a search can be valid
even when the person(s) to be searched is/are not identified by name but merely
described, though here the search was invalidated and evidence suppressed
where the officer executing the warrant testified he did not pay attention to the
details of the description, particularly the height, when determining which
persons to search); and Gonzales v. State, 761 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App. 1988).
207 See Simmons, supra note 206, at B § 8(b); see also Gonzales, 761 S.W.2d
809 (search was upheld where the warrant permitted the search of two "latin
males" but did not provide any additional description of the persons; however, it
did limit the search to a single specified apartment); State v. Hamilton, 840 P.2d
1061 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating a search where the person was
described as "Jim, a black male").
208 See generally People v. Velez, 562 N.E.2d 247 (111. App. Ct. 1990)
(upholding the search where the warrant authorized the search of a person of
"Israel, a white male Hispanic, 5'7", 145 lbs., with black hair" but the defendant
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Critics are justifiably concerned about the risk "that forensic
genetic profiles that include racial descriptions or racialized
language will reinforce or recreate stereotypes of minorities as
dangerous, criminal and morally inferior. "209 However, racial
descriptions-without more-have long been rejected as an
adequate basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 210 The
use of proportional DNA ancestry and indirect molecular
photofitting might actually serve to dispel false black-white
dichotomies and typological stereotypes by allowing to appreciate
the complex "ethnogenetic layers"2 1' and substantial diversity
found within groups of individuals who happen to have been
categorized, by themselves or by others, as belonging to the same
was 5'11", 195 pounds and where the informant whose information was relied
upon for the affidavit accompanied the officer executing the warrant and
identified the defendant).
209 Ossorio, supra note 196, at 285.
210 See generally Davis, supra note 31.
211 Fatimah L.C. Jackson, Anthropological Measurement: The Mismeasure of
African Americans, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 154, 164.
Professor Jackson states that:
Ethnogenetic layering (applied to the U.S. context) relies on the
historical fact that, as different ethnic groups have occupied various
regions of the country and as genes and culture have flowed between
resident groups, the United States has become a mosaic over
geographical space. Over the last 500 years, waves of different groups
from various specific parts of the world have come to particular U.S.
geographical regions, established residence, interacted with each other,
and been acted upon by the existing biotic and abiotic environments.
The major ancestral groups contributing to the U.S. gene pool are
Western and Northern Europeans, Western and Central Africans,
Native American Indians, and East Asians. However, among specific
regional groups of Americans, both the percentage and specific allelic
contributions of these ancestral groups vary. Over the generations, each
part of the country developed different constellations of ethnic origins,
creating a mosaic over geographical space and through time. By
carefully documenting the genetic aspects of this mosaic, a framework
emerges for identifying pockets of particular types of variation. Studies
of the molecular genetics of various groups of Americans have revealed
that some of these pockets of variation provide insights into the




race and/or ethnicity.2 12 Developing rigid, uniform standards for
laboratory technicians reporting the results to investigative officers
might prove sufficient to prevent any actual or perceived racial
discrimination by law enforcement utilizing DNA ancestry and
indirect molecular photofitting technologies. For example,
standards should require every laboratory to provide similar visual
representation of the test results that reflect the statistical,
probabilistic nature of the results.213
DNA WitnessTM is a method developed to identify a suspect
through genomic ancestry testing that could be used by law
enforcement to bolster eyewitness identifications or to provide
212 See Indrani Halder et al., A Panel of Ancestry Informative Markers for
Estimating Individual Biogeographical Ancestry and Admixture from Four
Continents: Utility and Applications, 29 HUM. MUTATION 648, 649 (2008).
The authors explain:
There are relatively few genomic regions that differ substantially
among populations. Yet, based on continental origin and
ethnogeographic affiliation, some phenotypes (e.g., skin color, height,
facial features, and hair textures) exhibit substantial variation as a
function, seemingly, of genetic ancestry. Given the substantial
interindividual variability in admixture proportions within most
historically intermixed populations, the relationship between overt
phenotypes and genetic ancestry (or social constructs) is tenuous. For
example, dark skin color imparted by eumelanin expression would not
be a good indicator of West African ancestry, since many other
populations such as Australian, Melanesian, and South Asians also
express higher levels of eumelanin and exhibit darker skin color. In
other cases, cryptic population structure contributed by recent ancestral
admixture can be common for many populations, yet not always
appreciable and certainly not quantifiable through self-assessment or
visual cues. Hence, the practice of binning persons into single
population groups can be inaccurate, and can confound genetic
associations contributing to both type I and II errors.
Id. See also Wagner & Shriver, supra note 188.
213 Forensic laboratories should all test with a standardized set of genetic
markers. It is unclear whether laboratories all test the same set of markers.
Testing different marker panels could give different results and prevent
comparisons between tests done in different labs. See generally Turi E. King &
Mark A. Jobling, What's in a Name? Y Chromosomes, Surnames and the
Genetic Genealogy Revolution, 25 TRENDS IN GENETICS, 351-60 (2009).
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leads on seemingly cold cases; 214 however, it is not infallible and
may be discriminatorily applied. A discriminatory impact could
result from this purportedly neutral tool if the underlying research
methods make it preferentially more probable that someone from
one population can be identified, prosecuted, and convicted on
genetic evidence compared to individuals from other
populations.2 15 Furthermore, there is an important distinction
between (1) predicting phenotypes of (and thereby identifying)
suspects based on genetic evidence and (2) predicting criminal
behavior based on genetic evidence, though the line is a thin one
(and possibly unrecognized by the minds of those prospective
jurors who spend their evenings watching "CSI"). The interests of
victims-who often want law enforcement to exhaust all resources
to catch those responsible-must be balanced with the interests the
innocent have in not being unjustly persecuted. These equal
protection considerations apply even to guilty persons: the
disparate impact may arise if the utilization of this technology
makes it more likely for law enforcement to identify and capture a
guilty person of one ethnicity than a guilty person of a different
ethnicity.
Technocratic statements that a DNA ancestry estimate is the
equivalent of evidence of race or ethnic identity216 are dangerous
exaggerations of the weight and relevancy law enforcement should
give to genetic test results. When a company provides law
enforcement officers with proportional ancestry estimates and
photos of individuals with similar estimates, there is little room to
argue from a legal standpoint that this is not racial profiling-
although scientists involved have done so, arguing that
214 DNA Witness 2.5TM is trademarked by DNAPrint Genomics. See
DNAPrint Genomics, http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/productsandservices
/forensics/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
215 This might arise from various sampling biases, for example.
216 Melba Newsome, A New DNA Test Can ID a Suspect's Race, But Police
Won't Touch It, WIRED, Jan. 2008, at 74.
FALL 2009] 91
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
"DNAWitnessTM will hold up to scientific scrutiny whereas
personal feelings and biases won't."21 7
When using any kind of evidence of the race and/or ethnicity218
of an individual to make an initial determination whether to
include that person as a possible suspect, one is engaging in
profiling. While DNA ancestry testing is statistically rigorous, it is
not free from biases due to the nature of reference databases and
markers chosen. Even the concept itself assumes the existence of
definable populations that can therefore have a "profile."
Moreover, there is a critical distinction between using DNA
ancestry to predict genealogical ancestry or personal identity (as in
well-established usage of fingerprints) and using it to predict
appearance or ethnic identity. Ancestry involves assumptions
about the predictive power of known genetic variation to
accurately reflect the ancestral genealogical lineages of
individuals, while predicting appearance requires a much more
problematic assumption about the level of genetic determinism and
the degree to which epigenomic factors obscure that connection.
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and legislators alike must
be educated on the intricacies of estimates of genomic ancestry
based on maximum likelihood analysis, as it is vital to the debate
over whether such evidence, which is marketed suggestively as the
equivalent to eyewitness testimony, sometimes with little or no
additional evidence, is sufficient to support a conviction requiring
guilt to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Translating the
nuanced scientific terminology into a digestible format for
members of the legal profession is not an easy task, but it is an
217 Sheri Fink, Reasonable Doubt: Questions about the Forensic Infallibility
of DNA Emerge Even as Police Begin to Use It to Profile Suspect by Race,
DISCOVER MAGAZINE, July 2006, at 54, 58.
218 I define race and ethnicity following Kevin Cokley, Critical Issues in the
Measurement of Ethnic and Racial Identity: A Referendum on the State of the
Field, 54 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 224, 225 (2007). Race is "a characterization
of a group of people believed to share physical characteristics such as skin color,
facial features, and other hereditary traits." Ethnicity is "a characterization of a
group of people who see themselves and are seen by others as having a common
ancestry, shared history, shared traditions, and shared cultural traits such as
language, beliefs, values, music, dress, and food" which can be defined broadly
to include biological traits or narrowly to exclude them.
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essential one, as the decisions handed down by courts reinforce the
beliefs of the public and may determine life or death, freedom or
incarceration, trust or distrust in law enforcement.
The validity of law enforcement using DNA ancestry testing
with indirect molecular photofitting to obtain a sample for DNA
identification must be addressed by first asking if testing a saliva
sample for DNA identification markers is a search subject to
Fourth Amendment restrictions. If such a testing is a search as
defined by the Fourth Amendment, then the reasonableness of this
search must be examined. To answer the first question, courts
must determine whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in one's DNA identification markers. To answer the latter
question, courts must determine whether the search is made
pursuant to (1) voluntary consent; (2) a warrant based upon
probable cause; or (3) an established exception to the warrant
requirement.
It is clear that American society values privacy.2 19 However,
the right to privacy, which was not recognized until 1890,220 can
take a variety of forms: informational, decisional, physical, and
proprietary. 22' There is some indication that the various forms of
privacy are becoming less important as the courts hint at a
"composite approach" to privacy.222 Privacy has long been
understood, however, as individual autonomy to control access to:
knowledge about oneself. But it is not simply control over the quantity
of information abroad; there are modulations in the quality of the
knowledge as well. We may not mind that a person knows a general
219 According to a CBS/New York Times poll taken in 2005, 52% of
Americans view their right to privacy as "under serious threat." See Joel
Roberts, Poll: Privacy Rights Under Attack: Americans Want Government to
Do More to Protect Their Privacy, CBS NEWS, Oct. 2, 2005, available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/30/opinion/polls/main894733.shtml.
220 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890).
221 See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
GENETIC ERA 31, 33-34 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
222 See Drobner, supra note 2.
FALL 2009] 93
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
fact about us, and yet feel our privacy invaded if he knows the
details."223
Moreover, with the much touted passage of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 ("GINA"),22 4 genetic
privacy is now widely acknowledged. 225  However, this genetic
privacy interest is due in part to a relatively poor understanding of
the complexity of genetics and, specifically, to genetic
exceptionalism. 2 6  Is this merely an instance where, as Judge
Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit argues, the individual's claim to privacy is merely the
individual's interest "to manipulate the world around them by
selective disclosure of facts about themselves"? 2 7 Posner's point
may be valid when the information the individual wants to protect
(or, from Posner's perspective, hide) is absolute, certain, and
immutable; however, much of genetic information, including
genetic ancestry information and predicted phenotypes, is merely
223 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968), as reprinted in
SoLovE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAw 45 (2d ed. 2006).
224 Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
225 The Human Genome Organization ("HUGO") is devoting a significant
portion of its Genomics, Ethics, Law and Society symposium in Geneva,
Switzerland (Nov. 2009) to the topic of genomic privacy. The late Senator
Edward Kennedy called the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act "the
first major new Civil Rights bill of the new century." Kathy L. Hudson et al.,
Keeping Pace with the Time-The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2662 (2008). See 23andMe "What Is
GINA?" available at https://www.23andme.com/you/faqwin/ginal (last visited
Oct. 11, 2009); EPIC, Genetic Privacy, http://epic.org/privacy/genetic/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009). For a database of states' genetic privacy laws, see
Genetic Privacy Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14287 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009). For a discussion on genetic privacy and a transition to
open consent, see Jeantine Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open
Consent, 9 NATURE REV. GENETICS 406 (2008).
226 See Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J. L. MED & ETHICS
174 (2008). See also J.K. Wagner, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008: Minimal Protections but Maximum Publicity. Poster presented at
the Annual meeting of the American Society of Human Genetics Nov. 2008;
J.K. Wagner, Understanding the Signs at the Crossroads of Genomics, Ethics,
Law and Society, Requirers Multidisciplinary Interpreters: DNA Ancestry Tests
as a Case Study, PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. (forthcoming).
227 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978),
excerpted in Solove et al., supra note 223, at 63.
94 [VOL. 11: 51
DNA Dragnets
probabilistic. Is it reasonable for anyone to have an expectation of
probabilistic privacy? Notions of genetic privacy-and the push
for legislation to protect such a right-are misguided.
Commentators have noted that "[g]enetic information is unique
because it is regarded as unique."228 Indeed, the entire genetic
privacy movement has been described as "a response to fears of
genetic determinism. "229
The reasonableness of an expectation of genetic privacy cannot
be judged as a static one-time determination, regardless of the
conservative forces of legal precedent. As early as the right to
privacy itself, scholars understood that rights must be judged with
a contextual awareness and that privacy law must adapt to
changing needs of society.2 30 When individuals recognize the
na'ivet6 of genetic determinism and begin to understand both the
complexities of gene-gene and gene-environment interactions and
the distinctions between various types of genetic information or
tests, the expectation of genetic privacy will necessarily
diminish-at least for some loci. While there is unquestionably a
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's medically relevant
genetic information,23 ' the reasonableness of an expectation of
228 Margaret Everett, Can You Keep a (Genetic) Secret? The Genetic Privacy
Movement, 13 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 273, 282 (2004) (quoting Mark A.
Rothstein, Genetic Secrets: A Policy Framework, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 451, 459
(1997)). But see Laura Plantinga et al., Disclosure, Confidentiality, and
Families: Experiences and Attitudes of Those with Genetic Versus Nongenetic
Medical Conditions, 119 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 51, 59 (2003) (finding "no
evidence that patients feel more strongly about the confidentiality of their
genetic or familial information than they do about any of their medical
information. . .. ").
229 See Everett, supra note 228, at 283.
230 Stephanie L. Anderson, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 119, 121 (2004) (reviewing
Graeme Laurie's Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms and
quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890)).
231 While genetic information is a powerful tool for biomedical researchers
and healthcare providers, "the role of the environment is extremely important for
nearly all behaviors and common diseases, and gene-environment interactions
are complex and dynamic . . . the presence of specific susceptibility genes is far
from a perfect predictor of the true probability of experiencing a given illness or
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genetic privacy solely in identification markers is far from certain.
There is a compelling argument that increasing our knowledge of
genetic identities, specifically via a national database, "will
promote 'racial justice,'" rather than promote racial profiling or
discrimination on a genetic level.232 Just as highlighting every
sentence on a page is the equivalent of highlighting nothing, so too
would be a national database. A national database would
theoretically eliminate or mitigate many of the criticized problems
with current DNA databases (such as the disproportionate
representation of minorities or the need for controversial familial
searches) and would theoretically provide equal benefits by
providing not only equal probability of getting caught for crimes
the individual has committed and left DNA evidence but also equal
opportunity to be identified in the aftermath of any abductions,
human trafficking, natural disasters or terrorist attacks.
While people generally do not intentionally advertise their
medical or genetic conditions, they do publicly expose their
identity (whether by name, physical appearance, ethnic affiliations,
group memberships, or other information that can tie them to
various aspects of their lives, including genetic information). For
example, Americans increasingly have Facebook profiles233 and
blogs234 that announce their identities to the world-albeit some in
exhibiting a given trait." Vence L. Bonham et al., Race and Ethnicity in the
Genome Era: The Complexity of the Constructs, 60 AM. PSYCH. 9, 13 (2005).
Genetic information, in most cases, will not accurately predict some information
most important to patients like how a particular condition will manifest itself in
that specific individual (e.g. time of onset, severity, and duration of the
condition). See Eric T. Juengst, Face Facts: Why Human Genetics Will Always
Provoke Bioethics, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 268 (2004).
232 Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in
Law Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 153, 155
(2006).
233 Facebook membership, for example, reportedly doubled its membership in
just eight months between August 2008 and April 2009. See Tim Stevens,
Facebook: 200 Million Served, SWITCHED, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.
switched.com/2009/04/09/facebook-200-million-served/.
234 See Danny Schechter, They Blog, I Blog, We All Blog, NIEMAN REPORTS,
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.aspx?id=101572 (stating that more
than 12 million American adults maintain a blog, more than 120,000 blogs are
created daily, and more than 1.4 million new blog posts are made daily).
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more revealing detail than others. Getting one's genome tattooed
onto one's arm has been reported.235 While many Americans hold
tight to personal interests of genetic privacy for themselves, many
other Americans purchase direct-to-consumer DNA kits to test
paternity or direct-to-consumer services which have become
widely known as "recreational genetics."236 Customers of
23andMe, Inc., for example, can (and frequently do) share their
DNA ancestry results and genetic results for a variety of clinical
and research traits with their friends, family, co-workers, and other
customers. 23 7  DNA testing is becoming routine in medical and
public spheres, which may correct the public's mistaken
assumptions of genetic essentialism or determinism and,
simultaneously, may shut the door on the special treatment of
genetic information. 238  For example, recent scholars have
concluded at least in the medical context that "[t]he association of
biomedical data with social identities is less risky when differences
in genetic frequencies or disease incidences are viewed as
consequences of the ways in which people are grouped rather than
as biological confirmations of perceived differences between those
groups."2 39
One possible solution that would provide clarity and
consistency to DNA sampling and Fourth Amendment questions is
that the Supreme Court set forth a narrow, categorical exception
for biometric identification, the verification of an individual's
identity through the use of "measurable physiological or behavioral
235 Griffin Longley, Human Bar Code, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 1, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 15538123 (discussing a company that offers not only
to preserve a customer's DNA indefinitely but also to print the customer's
genetic code on consumer goods like t-shirts or mugs).
236 See Opening Bell, THE BRADENTON HERALD, Sept. 20, 2002, at 1 B.
237 See 23andMe's "Genome Sharing" feature. I personally share my genomic
information with some of my family members, friends, and co-workers.
238 See M.W. Foster et al., The Routinization of Genomics and Genetics:
Implications for Ethical Practices, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 635 (2006) (concluding
that "[G]enetic information may no longer be treated as exceptional in
comparison to other kinds of biomedical information," and recognizing the
routinization of genetics and genomics may bring with it many unintended
consequences requiring bioethical discussions).
239 Id. at 637.
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characteristics."240 As David Kaye, Distinguished Professor of
Law at the Pennsylvania State University's Dickinson School of
Law and expert in genetics evidence has explained, determining
whether the exception is applicable to the case would involve a
three-prong analysis to determine that: (1) "[t]he process is not
physically or mentally invasive;" (2) "[t]he data are useful
primarily to link individuals to crime scenes or to establish the true
identity of a given individual;" and (3) "[t]he data are valid,
reliable, and effective for linking individuals to crime scenes or
establishing the true identity of a given individual."24'
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
DNA ancestry testing and indirect molecular photofitting are
forensic tools with limited utility. Law enforcement is often called
upon to catch criminal offenders on scant clues. DNA ancestry
results and indirect molecular photofitting provide probative
information that could assist with an otherwise mystifying
investigation. The usefulness of DNA ancestry testing and indirect
molecular photofitting is inversely related to the amount of
evidence available concerning the crime at hand. It would be
erroneous to argue that an individual should be prosecuted because
of similarity between the individual's DNA ancestry proportions
and those of a forensic sample. Likewise, it would be misguided to
suggest an individual should be prosecuted because of similarity
between the individual's appearance and predictions of a
perpetrator's appearance, whether those predictions are based on
an eyewitness's description, a video image, or indirect molecular
photofitting. However, it would be equally misguided to argue that
law enforcement should knowingly ignore clues exposed using
240 Kaye, supra note 4, at 192-95, n.78. Application of Y-DNA ancestry tests
and surname prediction has been, according to King and Jobling, proven in
theory but not yet applied. The authors caution premature forensic application
without consideration of several important research design questions, warning
that because the link between Y-DNA ancestry and surnames is weak for
common surnames and because including all rare variations of surnames into the
search is impractical, the utility may be compromised in urban populations.
King & Jobling, supra note 213, at 355-57.
241 Kaye, supra note 4, at 193-94 (emphasis removed).
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these technologies that suggest some leads be given more weight
than others.
Critics are right to question the fairness and reliability of any
investigatory tool, including DNA technologies, especially since
the American legal system values a presumption of innocence. Yet
citizens have a duty to cooperate with law enforcement and help
ensure that innocent people are not wrongly prosecuted. Critics
correctly insist that investigations and prosecutions are conducted
without discriminating against any protected class (such as race,
ethnicity, nationality, sex, or religion). Yet critics of DNA
ancestry testing and indirect molecular photofitting should not
confuse the distinct roles that investigators and prosecutors play in
our criminal justice system, or the critical distinctions between
suspects and defendants.242 Policymakers, judges, law enforcement
officers, and civil rights activists alike must develop a more
nuanced understanding of genetics-one that appreciates the
complex interactions between genes and environment and the
significance of biological, cultural, and biocultural forces that
shape the world. Criminal behavior is not caused by DNA
ancestry, a suite of physical characteristics, or DNA identification
markers, yet DNA ancestry is often correlated with suites of
physical characteristics, and physical characteristics are of
undeniable value when trying to identify a person.
DNA ancestry testing and indirect molecular photofitting might
help investigators narrow the pool of potential suspects from
whom they seek DNA identification samples-regardless of the
method selected from those just described. While selective
investigation and prosecution of minorities is a legitimate cause for
concern, there is no logical reason to assume the use of DNA
technologies by law enforcement would "further distort the racial
bias in the criminal justice system."243 Criminal profiling (as
242 See Fullwiley, supra note 2 (incorrectly focusing on the trial phase when
DNA ancestry and indirect molecular photofitting is applied at the investigatory
stage and would be irrelevant at trial).
243 Troy Duster, DNA Dragnets and Race: Larger Social Context, History
and Future, 25 GENEWATCH 3-5 (2008) (arguing racialized dragnets, expansion
of DNA databases to include arrestees and the CSI effect "can and will further
distort the racial bias in the criminal justice system.").
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opposed to racial profiling)-i.e., using specific crime scene
information to create or infer a general description or "profile" of
the criminal suspect-has long been acceptable investigative work:
excluding individuals from a suspect pool simply because the
individuals are right-handed and the perpetrator is predicted to be
left-handed would not raise controversy. Conversely, using DNA
ancestry testing alone raises concerns since there is the potential
that investigators without a firm understanding of the technology's
capabilities and limitations will place individuals inside or outside
of the suspect pool merely on the basis of the suspect's predicted
membership in a protected class (i.e., on the basis of race or
ethnicity).
DNA ancestry with indirect molecular photofitting (and
eventually direct molecular photofitting, if labors of current
research ever bear fruit) is concededly far from an exact science.
However, the technology is able to provide investigators with more
probative information, like whether a suspect with given genetic
ancestry proportions is likely to have certain physical features or
perhaps even a surname or variant thereof.2" Some scholars have
argued that the dangers of the technique can be minimized by
limiting the traits that investigators are permitted to predict.245 For
example, Koops and Schellekens, Tilburg Institute for Law,
Technology and Society professor of regulation and technology
and assistant professor of law and technology, respectively, argue
that "externally perceptible traits" (like hair color) and "non-
sensitive behavioral traits" (like handedness) should be permissible
since police already use such information as obtained through
alternative criminal profiling techniques.24 6 It is uncertain whether
DNA ancestry tests and indirect molecular photofitting would
increase investigators' "tunnel vision" and cause them to value the
DNA predictions above other relevant clues, or whether the
244 See King & Jobling, supra note 213.
245 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 182.
246 Id. These authors have a narrow definition of indirect molecular
photofitting. Koops and Schellekens define indirect molecular photofitting as
providing only predictions of geographic origin and surnames and direct
molecular photofitting as predicting body features and behavioral
characteristics.
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technologies may help remove the prejudicial blinders that
investigators may have toward minorities.247
The public's perception of racial profiling, DNA dragnets, and
genetic witnesses is just as important as the reality of law
enforcement's use of DNA ancestry testing and indirect molecular
photofitting. The Supreme Court could remove the drama from the
situation by specifically deciding (1) whether NIOs are
constitutional under the Federal Constitution, (2) whether a Federal
Constitutional exception should be made for DNA identification
testing, and (3) whether individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his/her DNA identification markers or other non-
medically relevant DNA loci. Until these questions are answered
by the Supreme Court, it would be wise to encourage Congress and
states to establish and to adopt uniform standards for laboratories
using DNA ancestry and indirect molecular photofitting during
investigations. Such standards would ensure that the investigators
on the street are given the results based on genetic realism (rather
than results based on genetic determinism, essentialism, or
exceptionalism). Moreover, .law enforcement agencies applying
DNA ancestry and indirect molecular photofitting would be wise
to adopt uniform standards (including written informed consent)
for its investigators seeking voluntary DNA samples (from
individuals or DNA line-ups) so as to dispel even the hint of
impropriety, coercion or duress. Finally, while we all should stay
on alert for infringements on our civil rights and liberties as law
enforcement develops and incorporates new investigatory tools in
questionable constitutional territory, we should not allow scientific
illiteracy or misconceptions about DNA ancestry testing
specifically or genetic information generally to control the debate.
247 Id. at 90.
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